Anomalous Monism as a Problem of Mental Causation

Authors

  • Janez Bregant Faculty of Education, University of Maribor

Keywords:

anti-reductionism, anomalous monism, nomological model of causation, supervenience, causal exclusion

Abstract

Davidson’s anomalous monism was in the 70’s of the last century one of the reasons that reductionism at the global level as the solution of the mind-body problem and mental causation begun to lose its power. But anomalous monism is neither free from fault since despite securing causal powers to mental events, it forgets causal powers of mental properties. So the mental still causes the physical in virtue of its physical and not its mental properties leaving therefore mental causation unsolved. Besides anomalous monism and its greatest problem, i.e. epiphenomenalism of mental properties, the article also introduces Fodor’s attempt to solve it and one of the possible objections to his proposal, which reveals all the troubles that antireductionists have while trying to save mental causation.

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Published

30.06.2003

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Bregant, J. (2003). Anomalous Monism as a Problem of Mental Causation. Analiza: časopis Za Kritično Misel, 7(1-2), 18–33. https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/6778