The Argument from Illusion – A Defense of Indirect Realism
Keywords:
epistemology, indirect realism, perception, sense-datum theory, illusion, hallucinationAbstract
When we look at a red ball or a stick, the basic activity of our senses is psychophysical act called perception. But perception of what? Physical objects? Do we immediately perceive physical objects, and if not, what is it that we are aware of in sensory or perceptual experience? The theory of indirect realism says that we perceive physical objects indirectly, if at all. The central aim of the paper is to point out the fundamental tenets of indirect realism and indicate its most promising kind.
The paper is divided into three parts. The first part presents the core defense of indirect realism presented by Ayer, based on the argument from illusion and the argument from hallucination. This part also presents the causal theory of perception, on which Ayer’s defense rests. The second part of the paper describes Austin’s objections to Ayer defense, and thereby the objections against indirect realism. The last part includes (i) my refutation of Austin’s objections and (ii) a presentation of Robinson’s causal argument, which is currently, in my opinion, the best defense of indirect realism.
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Copyright (c) 2002 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

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