Valuation and Desire
Keywords:
valuation, dispositional theory of, desire, belief, object of a valuationAbstract
The aim of the present text is to present and to evaluate a David Lewis’ dispositional theory of value. His naturalistic theory is not an object theory: It does not accept sui generis objects of valuations. Valuations are desires of a higher, second order. The author strongly sympathizes with the Lewis' stressing of the role of an imaginative reason in finding out what our values really are. I do not agree with Lewis in claiming that all our valuations are desires. Some of them are strivings. At the end the author argues for a thesis that Lewis is facing a dilemma: he must either abandon a claim that there are not sui generis objects of valuations, or he is left without a good reason for an intuitively very strong claim that valuations are not beliefs.
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Copyright (c) 2002 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

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