Contextualism and Skepticism
Keywords:
epistemology, contextualism, skepticism, Rule of Attention, David LewisAbstract
It is argued that Lewis’s version of contextualist reply to skepticism in his “Elusive knowledge” faces serious problems. It relies on the Rule of Attention which is ambiguous, and the ambiguity is being exploited in its defense. The Lewisian contextualist has either to show how any important philosophical result can follow from its trivial reading, or to defend a non-trivial and demanding one. But on the demanding reading, the Rule enjoins epistemic sloth and other vices. It also appears to fail to preserve closure, in spite of Lewis’s claims to the contrary. These problems seem to support a measure of pessimism as to the general viability of contextualism as an answer to skepticism.
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