Knowledge and Belief
Keywords:
knowledge, belief, truth, epistemic subject, scienceAbstract
The relationship between knowledge and belief has been discussed. I analyse four objections against the thesis that knowledge includes belief: 1. knowledge is essentially different from belief, 2. plurality of the meaning of knowledge and belief, 3. scientific knowledge does not need epistemic subject, and 4. belief is scientifically untenable concept that has to be replaced or eliminated. Each of these objections has its right but if we accept some reformulation of belief, we could agree with the thesis: knowledge includes belief. The opposite way is also possible, namely the definition of belief through knowledge: belief := knowledge in abstraction from truth. This lead us to the definition: knowledge := true belief. The notion of belief thus coincides with the usual notion of justified belief. However, this move leads us to the nearly meaningless circular definitions like belief := true belief in abstraction from truth, or knowledge := knowledge in abstraction from truth, which is true. This fact indicates to an essential interchange of knowledge and belief. It indicates also that an explicit definition of knowledge through belief is impossible.
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Copyright (c) 2000 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

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