Positivistic Criticism of Cogito II

Abstract

In this (second) part of the article I will present and try to evaluate the arguments used by positivists to undermine cogito – the essence of Descartes’s philosophy. Descartes’s claims were: (1) cogito is the first link in justification of our beliefs; and (2) cogito is absolutely certain link in justification of our beliefs. Reichenbach renounces both claims. In sequel I consider Von Mises’s objections against cogito and indicate that part of his objections is unjustified. Carnap’s criticism of cogito consists of two arguments: (1) Descartes’s cogito violates the logical rule that we can predicate the existence only in conjunction with predicate; and (2) the second Descartes’s error lies in transition from “I think” to “I exist”. What follows from “I think” is not “I exist” but “there is something who thinks”. I argue that both Carnap’s claims are invalid.