The Self and its Identity: The Problem of Diachronic Identity of the Minimal Self

Abstract

In the last few decades there has been a lively debate on the problem of the self both in phenomenological and analytical circles. Among authors that endorse an experiential or minimal notion of the self, the main point of contention has been the diachronic identity problem, i.e. the question whether the experiential self retains its identity through time and, if so, to what extent. In this paper I begin with a brief exposition of two prominent notions of the experiential self, those elaborated by Dan Zahavi and Galen Strawson, followed by a comparison of the two authors’ views on diachronic identity. After highlighting what I believe to be certain ambiguities and weaknesses in Zahavi’s criticism of Strawson, I argue for a clear and explicit distinction between two different notions of identity, namely those of weak and strong diachronic identity. Finally, I question to what extent Zahavi’s notion of the minimal self might be helpful in addressing problems of personal identity, arguing that his own proposal – that of combining the minimal self with other, more complex models (such as the narrative self) – is fraught with certain methodological difficulties.