Neuroscience and Law: From the Reductionism to the Looping Effects of Neurolaw

Abstract

In the article, we first present the growing trend of using neuroscientific evidence and findings in legal contexts. Second, we briefly present with a few examples the trust neuroscientific explanations and descriptions seem to prompt in laypersons and legal decision-makers. Third, we critically elucidate neuroscience’s reductionist and mechanistic view of the human nature. We argue that we need to be cautious in combining objectivist and reductionist neuroscience with the law based on the values and decisions of legal decision-makers and the public given that neuroscience’s reductionist-mechanistic view of human agency alters our beliefs and intuitions about phenomena, which are important to the law (such as personhood, volition, self-control, decision-making), thus influencing these same beliefs and related phenomena. We suggest that this holds even more so in the context of an increasing integration of neuroscience into the public domain, such as the law, which further alters our beliefs and intuitions on the studied phenomena, thus possibly changing human thinking and activity. Neuroscience’s view of human nature and its integration into legal contexts thus lead to the looping effects of the law where neuroscience and neurolaw in fact influence the (future) findings of neuroscience. This in turn means that neuroscience is not an objective science of human nature and behavior on which the law could finally base its correct and/or unbiased decisions.