The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis: the Wittgensteinian Perspective

Abstract

In the article we apply Wittgenstein's concept of philosophy to the dispute over the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Our position is that the background of this dispute includes a latent philosophical problem which cannot be resolved within the classical debate. We see the source of the philosophical problem in the intuitive conception of thinking as a mental process. Our strategy is to first briefly present the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and the basic structure of the argument that causes problems. This is followed by an explanation of the field of philosophical grammar representing the framework for the concept of thinking which is not so weighted by philosophical problems. It is only within the field of philosophical grammar that a possibility is created for a clear overview of the notion of thinking, which does not have to deal with unnecessary and misleading questions about thought and language. In conclusion, we explain in more detail the conditions under which Wittgenstein can be labeled as a linguistic determinist.