View from Somewhere: From Autopoiesis to Enactive Cognition
Keywords:
neurophenomenology, embodied cognition, mind-body problem, problem of consciousness, epistemology, theory of (cognitive) scienceAbstract
Neurophenomenology, one of the more prominent responses to Chalmers’ »hard problem of consciousness«, is a research programme characterized by an attempt to integrate phenomenological and neuroscientific methods in the field of consciousness studies. However, taken in vacuo it is susceptible to flawed philosophical interpretations and therefore needs to be incorporated into a broader theoretical context (the so-called embodied/enactive cognition), whose primary motivation is to transcend the epistemological dualism (representationalism) of modern science. The article tries to reconstruct this fundamental framework of embodied/enactive cognition in three subsequent steps – from cellular bio-logics through neural neuro-logics to wholesome enacto-logics – and thereby indicate why it is wrong to interpret neurophenomenology as a conceptual (theoretical) solution to the hard problem and should instead be understood as an integral part of a pragmatic attempt to eliminate the problem on an experiential and existential level.
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