Existential Despair and the Meaning of Life
Keywords:
meaning of life, existential anxiety, Sysiphus, practical scepticism and existential pesimism, worthwhile activities and pursuitsAbstract
The article addresses the riddle of life’s meaning. It pursues two goals: first, it aims to demistify the issue of the meaning of life, and, second, it offers comfort to those who have lost faith in life by presenting meaningful life as an attainable ideal. With respect to the first issue, I propose a simple solution to the riddle of the meaning of life. The appearance of its difficulty, even insolvability, comes from the fact that the question is often misinterpreted and mistaken for a host of other related, yet not logically equivalent questions. Existential angst, or despair, as I understand it, is despair that stems from a mixture of practical skepticism and existential pesimism. To fall prey to it, not only your belief in those reasons for which you do things that you do, needs to be shaken, but your belief in practical reason as such, i.e. in reasons for pursuing any goals at all, needs to be undermined as well. Hence, an existential pesimist is someone who cannot find any good reasons for doing anything at all, or for pursuing some goals rather than other.
Fortunately, such genuine, i.e. radical and global existential angst/despair can be treated. All we need is a proof to the effect that at least some human pursuits are meaningful or that some of them are more meaningful than others. Since meaningful pursuits alone make life meaningful (while meaningless pursuits render it meaningless), this is the only argument we can, but also the only one we need to, give. And which among many human pursuits are such? In the article, I don’t offer much more than a sketch of an answer to this question: a given pursuit, P, is meaningful, if P is either something worth doing for its own sake, or it contributes to the attainment of an end worth pursuing for its own sake.
The proposed account is thus formal. I argue that life is meaningful, as long as it is (to a sufficient degree) composed of, or filled with, meaningful relationships, pursuits and activities. But apart from some rather general observations (that the latter presuppose the existence of worthwhile goals and/or worthwhile activities), I offer no substantive account of what makes certain relationships, pursuits or activities meaningful. (According to Thomas Nagel, this is the easier part of the overall task anyway.) And I leave the relation between various meaningful pursuits and activities and a meaningful life largely unspecified. What I do offer instead are some powerful reasons for resisting the temptations of practical scepticism and existential pesimism. I try to show that the usual battery of arguments which seem to motivate a typical skeptic/pesimist »What’s the point of doing that, or, for that reason, of doing anything at all?« challenge to any practical advice, does little to undermine our belief in the existence of normative, justifying reasons for desires, plans and actions, and that as long as this belief can be salvaged, meaning will be secured both for certain human activities and, (by implication) at least some human lives.
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Copyright (c) 2012 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

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