Between Truth and Falsity
Keywords:
Łukasiewicz, principle of bivalence, law of excluded middle, many-valued logic, supervaluationism, logical determinismAbstract
Łukasiewicz in his rectoral speech »On Determinism« was the first logician who clearly stated a difference between the principle of bivalence (BIV) and the law of excluded middle (LEM). Nowadays these principles of classical logic are closely connected but not equivalent (Tarski scheme (T) and classical negation establish their equivalence). Łukasiewicz defends an Aristotelian solution to the problem of logical determinism and future contingents: LEM is valid for sentences about future but BIV is not. A different interpretation of negation in the frame of many-valued logic enables such a solution. But a better way to go is supervaluationism. This approach works if we assume indeterminism and a different interpretation of scheme (T). I argue, however, that the threat posed by logical determinism per se does not require any revisions of standard logic. We could deny that propositions are true or false at times or just accept a truism (Merricks): a proposition is true because things are such as that proposition represents things as being—and not the other way around. And the same dependency is true of necessity of propositions.
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