Thinking Mechanisms and Intelligence
Keywords:
Artificial Intelligence, Turing, thought, understanding, SearleAbstract
In the classical text on the possibilities and limitations of artificial intelligence (AI) “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (1950), A. M. Turing considered the question “Can machines think?” dismissed it as being rather ambiguous, and introduced a kind of game which he called the “imitation game”, instead. Similarly, the term intelligence*^ explicitly related to machines solely in the title of his poper. Still, these theoretical issues (i.e. thought and intelligence in machines) turned out to become the fundamental topic of the emerged scientific field.
In this dispute, my basic objective is to point out that utilizing (or constructing) thinking mechanisms is a necessary, but insufficient condition for exhibiting (artificial) intelligence. As the two are often regarded as synonymous, especially in the field of Al, I begin my discussion by presenting the historical and linguistic background of the matter. As next I relate the subject in hand to well known psychological theories of S. Freud and C G. Jung. Finally, the importance of understanding turns out to be the most important topic of the subject in hand. I confront my understanding of understanding to the views of American philosopher J. Searle, who totally denies the possibility of understanding in machines.
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