Austere Realism and Quasi-Particularist Semantic Normativity
Keywords:
Common sense, atomism, normativity, composition question, vagueness, relevance, austere realism, truth as indirect correspondence, holismAbstract
Common sense is seemingly incompatible with austere realism: the first one presupposes the existence of o multitude of entities, whereas the second one adopts just the existence of one. Making them compatible requires the shift from understanding truth as direct correspondence towards understanding truth as indirect correspondence. In the čase we take normativity into account while explaining truth, we may notice that common sense is inclined towards deconstructing itself, because of its atomistic and tractable presuppositions. The generalist semantic normativity of common sense encounters questions of composition and of vagueness. Because it is unable to find an appropriate grounding for these, common sense is forced to adopt holistic and nontractable presuppositions. Generalist semantic normativity gets substituted by particularist semantic normativity because of this. Thereby, truth as indirect correspondence is adopted. In this manner, compatibility of common sense with austere realism is made possible.
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