Scepticism and Transfer of Knowledge
Keywords:
scepticism, weak principle of transfer, latent knowledge, implicit knowledge, relevance, DretskeAbstract
Ule in his book criticizes the sceptical use of the so called weak principle of transfer: if you know that p and you know that p entails q and your belief that q is based on an inference from your beliefs p and that p entails q, then you know that q. According to Ule this principle: (i) poses no threat to latent knowledge; (ii) allows for the possession of irrelevant knowledge. The problem with (i) is that in other places Ule claims that the weak principle of transfer is implicitly valid and threatens implicit knowledge only. The problem with (ii) is that every logicol principle allows for irrelevant conclusions. Ule must show that the specific sceptical use of the principle is irrelevant and does not endanger knowledge claims. I compare various approaches to relevance (Dretske, Stine) to show that Ule’s final solution is problematic.
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Copyright (c) 2005 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

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