Some Forms of the Skepsis about Truth

Authors

  • Andrej Ule Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana

Keywords:

truth, T-schema, truth-measure, attainability of truth, truth operator

Abstract

I‘m stressing some key thoughts from my book “Attainability of Truth” (2004) and add some new thoughts. I give some reasons for the skepsis about truth or about the attainability of truth, and I reject them. We can attain truth (on empirični reality) but we do not have any sure knowledge about that. We could have only some rational bets on truth. Finally I odd the hypothesis on truth as a reduced modal operator of propositions. The danger of the liar paradox is evaded by the distinction between the truth-operator in the object language and the semantical predicate of truth in the metalanguage, and by the refusal of the self-insertion operator for statements (but the results of self-insertions are allowed as the expressions of propositions).

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Published

31.05.2005

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Ule, A. (2005). Some Forms of the Skepsis about Truth. Analiza: časopis Za Kritično Misel, 9(1-2), 35–51. https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/6933