Some Forms of the Skepsis about Truth
Keywords:
truth, T-schema, truth-measure, attainability of truth, truth operatorAbstract
I‘m stressing some key thoughts from my book “Attainability of Truth” (2004) and add some new thoughts. I give some reasons for the skepsis about truth or about the attainability of truth, and I reject them. We can attain truth (on empirični reality) but we do not have any sure knowledge about that. We could have only some rational bets on truth. Finally I odd the hypothesis on truth as a reduced modal operator of propositions. The danger of the liar paradox is evaded by the distinction between the truth-operator in the object language and the semantical predicate of truth in the metalanguage, and by the refusal of the self-insertion operator for statements (but the results of self-insertions are allowed as the expressions of propositions).
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Copyright (c) 2005 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

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