Moore’s Proof of an External World and Common Knowledge

Authors

  • Andrej Ule Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana

Keywords:

Moore, existence of an external world, skepticism, knowledge, common knowledge

Abstract

Moore’s proof of an external world is analyzed and compared with other arguments against skepticism based on the transmission of knowledge premise. and then try to discover its real power. Moore doesn’t need transmission of knowledge but the usual logical implication. The crucial steps of the argument are the two Moore’s “pragmatic” inferences from his (two-times) weaving with his hands to his knowledge of the existence of his two hands. Moore’s two times weaving with his hands and reasoning that he knows he has hands implies knowledge of knowledge, and not only ordinary knowledge, that he has hands. But one can threaten the argument even in this case by pointing to the logical possibility of a skeptical hypothesis. I conclude that we have to enter the infinite iterations of knowledge in order to evade this possibility. This is possible only in case of common knowledge of all of the participants in the discussion. Moore (maybe) ’achieved’ this knowledge by his ’performance’ in the lecture hall. The skeptic has to respect this result, his drawing our attention to the possible illusionary nature of the external world rests on an empty logical possibility.

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Published

31.12.2007

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Ule, A. (2007). Moore’s Proof of an External World and Common Knowledge. Analiza: časopis Za Kritično Misel, 11(4), 45–54. https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/6814