Contingency and Necessity of Natural Laws
Keywords:
natural laws, contingency view of natural laws, necessity view of natural lawsAbstract
Although it is very unlikely that we actually know any laws of nature (i.e. they are not to be confounded with scientific laws that are only (reasonable) approximations to at least some of the real laws of nature), we do assume that we know quite a lot about their general formal structure - we know the forms which statements of law take: they are contingent universal propositions. The standard question philosophers of science and metaphysicians have been asking was where universality derives from (whether merely from regularities, or from some nomic necessity). To question the contingency, e.g. to take the dissenting view and claim that laws are metaphysically necessary, was however only peripherally discussed with the view of finding a suitable backing for the nomic necessity (e.g. Bird, Shoemaker). In my paper, I shall focus on the view that laws are metaphysically necessary in its own right. I shall argue that granted that necessity view of laws is consistent in both its forms (Bird), the weak (laws necessary hold in all those worlds, where the properties that they invoke exist), and the strong one (laws necessary hold in all worlds), the strong one remains a much more demanding alternative.
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