Veber’s Criticism of Phenomenalist Theories of Perception
Keywords:
perception, reality, association, inference, reification abilityAbstract
The paper deals with Veber's criticism of mediate theories of perception. Veber's objection claims that we do not need a special activity of reason for founding our cognitive abilities. His reification ability acts as a substitute for association between individual feelings or inference to reality or formation of individual feelings into a whole. Reification ability is an awareness of things as causes of our perceptions. This ability precedes our knowledge of individual properties. Finally, it turns out that reification ability is not to be placed in the realm of sensorial but rather in the domain of higher cognitive abilities. With such opinion Veber comes close to theories which are target of his criticism.
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Copyright (c) 2001 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

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