Veber’s Criticism of Phenomenalist Theories of Perception

Authors

  • Bogomil Kropej Faculty of Education, University of Maribor

Keywords:

perception, reality, association, inference, reification ability

Abstract

The paper deals with Veber's criticism of mediate theories of perception. Veber's objection claims that we do not need a special activity of reason for founding our cognitive abilities. His reification ability acts as a substitute for association between individual feelings or inference to reality or formation of individual feelings into a whole. Reification ability is an awareness of things as causes of our perceptions. This ability precedes our knowledge of individual properties. Finally, it turns out that reification ability is not to be placed in the realm of sensorial but rather in the domain of higher cognitive abilities. With such opinion Veber comes close to theories which are target of his criticism.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Published

31.03.2002

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Kropej, B. (2002). Veber’s Criticism of Phenomenalist Theories of Perception. Analiza: časopis Za Kritično Misel, 5(3), 85–104. https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/6735