Husserl’s Views on Logic

Abstract

The paper’s subject is a sketch of Husserl’s views on logic from Philosophy of Arithmetic and Logical Investigations to his later works. Brentano and his adherents saw the grounds of logic in psychology. In Philosophy of Arithmetic Husserl shares the Brentano’s view but later, under the influence of Frege, has changed his mind and criticized psychologism in order to take the side of pure logic. Logic becomes in this sense a priori science with specific laws and unconditional validity. The task of constitution of the pure logic is explanation of the logical ideas, notions, and laws. Thus Husserl’s view on logic cross the border of logic and becomes phenomenological investigation of language, that is, expression and meaning. Psychical facts are not the implications of logical norms. This fact is additional proof of logic as autonomous normative science. But the question whether such a phenomenological consideration of logic can avoid psychological elements still remains to be solved.