Expressive Value of Art in Light of Kant's Theory of Aesthetic Ideas

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to resolve some of the inconsistencies within Kant’s theory of aesthetic ideas. Specifically, Kant’s text appears to be imbued with the following two tensions related to his conception of representational and non-representational art. First, there appears to be a conflict between his commitment to the view that mere sensations cannot function as vehicles for the communication of aesthetic ideas and his claim that musical tones, on the account of being mere sensations, can express aesthetic ideas. Second, his description of musical form as consisting of a play of aesthetic ideas that leave behind no thoughts appears to be incongruous with his formulation of aesthetic ideas as free imaginative representations that contain a wealth of thoughts and meanings. If what it means to express aesthetic ideas is precisely to stimulate much thinking, then how can an object exist that expresses aesthetic ideas, but without leaving any thoughts behind? I attempt to resolve these two perceived tensions by proposing a distinction between productive and reproductive aesthetic ideas communicated by form and mere sensations respectively.