Heidegger through Argument

Abstract

The paper applies Šuster’s Moč argumenta to the analysis of a famous text from the “high-profile” continental tradition, namely to Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art.” It relies on the general idea of reconstructing implicit arguments step by step, and appeals to Šuster’s characterization of hidden assumptions in order to pin down the main weaknesses in Heidegger’s presentation of his ideas. They consist in (1) the number and crucial importance of assumptions left implicit and (2) the number of claims and steps left without any argument. Commentators, originating in Heideggerian tradition, leave most of the issues unresolved. The last part of the paper discusses David Weberman’s brilliant attempt to defend the poetic style of the relevant tradition. We accept his idea that implicit argumentation is sometimes sufficient, but note that in many cases there is no indication of any such implicit procedure(s). We also accept his idea that philosophers propose models of various philosophically relevant situations or configurations, but note that original and unusual models often demand arguments in their favor. Finally, as far as Weberman’s defense of figurative, metaphorical language in philosophy goes, we note that in central cases, in which the important metaphors are used, at least some indication of the intended way of literary unpacking is needed.