Analiza je revija za analitično filozofijo, ki poudarja racionalni, argumentativni pristop k filozofskim problemom tako s teoretičnega kot praktičnega področja. V uvodniku prve številke, ki je izšla leta 1997, je takratno uredništvo prepoznalo tri razloge, ki so govorili v prid taki reviji. Prvič, omogočala naj bi nadaljnji razvoj analitične filozofije v Sloveniji. Drugič, domači publiki naj bi predstavljala svetovne domete analitične filozofije in pa domačo ustvarjanje. Tretjič, z razvijanjem slovenske terminologije in z zastavljanjem vprašanj ter iskanjem odgovorov, ki imajo izvor v tu in sedaj, naj bi skrbela za razvoj slovenske identitete. Ti razlogi so relevantni še danes, se je pa skozi čas pokazalo, da ta vprašanja niso le filozofsko relevantna, temveč imajo širši domet. Revija je tako danes širše orientirana in objavlja članke, ki so zanimivi tudi za »nefilozofsko« publiko, predvsem članke s širšo kulturno vsebino (multikulturalizem, akulturacija, asimilacija, problem pravic kulturnih manjšin itn.) in članke s področja teorije umetnosti. Revija se na reflektiran in kritičen način ukvarja tudi z aktualnimi problemi, ki tarejo našo družbo (etična problematika, problem migracij, politična filozofija, socialni problemi družbe, izobraževanje itn.). V prihodnosti bomo še večjo pozornost posvetili filozofskim vprašanjem, ki jih odpirajo raziskovanja v sodobni kognitivni znanosti (npr. etične in družbene implikacije nevroznanosti in umetne inteligence).
Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti
Phenomenology of Consciousness (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Contemporary Neuroscience)
Consciousness is one of the most mysterious yet fundamental topics in the philosophy of mind. Although contemporary neuroscience offers increasingly precise descriptions of brain processes, the question of how these processes give rise to subjective experience—feelings, colours, pain—remains unresolved. This paper focuses on the phenomenological approach developed by Edmund Husserl and later expanded by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology does not treat consciousness as an enclosed internal process but rather as intentional directedness toward the world, where meaning emerges within experience itself. Special emphasis is placed on Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the body as a “lived body,” which constitutes the condition of perception and our embeddedness in the world. The paper further examines the problem of qualia—the question of how subjective experiences transcend objective descriptions—and demonstrates that the phenomenological approach opens a space for dialogue with contemporary theories such as embodied cognition, enactivism, and neuroscience. The article shows that phenomenology does not provide a definitive answer to the question of consciousness, but it can be understood as a complement to modern sciences, offering a more comprehensive insight into the nature of consciousness.
Copyright (c) 2025 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.29.2.223-246.2025
Analysis of Veber's Aesthetic Experience
Every person experiences aesthetic perception throughout their existence. Everyday experiences of beauty and art are often taken for granted, and we rarely take the time to analyze them. France Veber, however, addressed exactly this in his extensive monograph Aesthetics. This not only applies to works of art but also to everyday objects, such as clothing and cars. We also speak of beauty in natural phenomena. However, these judgments are quite unreliable: it can happen that something seems beautiful to us at one moment, but after some time, it becomes insignificant. Or vice versa. For example, Van Gogh’s paintings were not very popular in his time, but over time, and especially now, he is considered one of the greatest painters of all time. Therefore, the concept of beauty is not only about aesthetic or artificial qualities but also fundamentally related to “human existence,” as Pirjevec writes. The article explores Veber’s aesthetic thought and discuss what aesthetic experiences and perceptions of beauty can be, as well as what underpins these experiences. Using Veber’s terminology, we will attempt to answer the question of what is perception and the intentionality of perception, while also reflecting on the possibility of inauthentic experiences.
Copyright (c) 2025 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.29.2.201-222.2025
The article discusses the role of language and rhetoric in understanding and solving contemporary environmental challenges. The author builds on a transitive argument that connects four key elements: society, environment, language, and rhetoric, where they begin by presenting an analysis of the negative impacts of industrial society on the environment, followed by a theoretical justification of language as a constitutive element of social reality. Using Searle's social ontology and speech act theory, the author then explains how linguistic orientation and agreements establish social facts and institutions. The main part of the text focuses on linguistic relativism and framing, where the author uses concrete examples to demonstrate the power of vocabulary and rhetoric in shaping public opinion. The concluding section presents the practical value of classical rhetoric, showing how the use of Aristotle's means of persuasion – ethos (character), logos (argumentation), and pathos (emotion) – can serve as an effective tool for promoting environmental responsibility. The author concludes that mastering environmental rhetoric is essential for the transition from mere awareness to actual social action.
Copyright (c) 2025 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.29.2.169-198.2025
Ethics and Freedom in the Political Thought of France Veber
This paper focuses on the moral philosophy of France Veber, addressing his understanding of freedom and ethics, as well as related concepts such as conscience, duty, value-based emotion, and aspiration, along with the questions that he examined in the ethical-moral context. Veber rejected both the eudaimonistic and the utilitarian conceptions of ethics, as he did not regard happiness as the ultimate goal of moral action – in his view, the ethical value of an act lies in its motive rather than its consequences. His ethical stance is also reflected in his political thought, as he criticized the idea that a nation, state, or humanity as a whole could strive for happiness. In doing so, he rejected collectivist political concepts that subordinate the individual to higher entities. Marxist circles dismissed his philosophy as reactionary even before the war. Veber was irritated by party conflicts and did not identify with any political party. He blamed materialism for war and social misery, which, in his opinion, resulted from a one-sided pursuit of material gain and the neglect of spiritual values – the very values he emphasized in his reflections on freedom and ethics.
Copyright (c) 2025 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.29.2.153-168.2025
The article examines the issue of Aristotle’s sexism from the perspective of contemporary concepts of gender, science, and epistemologically responsible interpretation. Positing that his sexism is not one-dimensional, the author introduces the concept of "multi-sexism" to describe the complex biological, political, and metaphysical relationships structuring his philosophical and scientific system. The analysis reveals that Aristotle’s gender hierarchy is deeply ingrained in his scientific framework, specifically regarding nature, movement, and teleology. The article argues that the debate on Aristotle's sexism is not about moral judgment, but rather a methodological question of interpretation: how to read historically conditioned philosophical and scientific concepts without reducing them to contemporary normative categories. Three key considerations are raised: (1) gender in Aristotle’s biology and metaphysics; (2) epistemological dilemmas in feminist philosophy of science in interpreting classical texts; and (3) reinterpreting Aristotle beyond sexually hierarchical structures. The aim is to demonstrate that understanding Aristotle as a multi-sexist is not merely a criticism, but that this approach offers a tool for a more precise analysis of the historical foundations of sexual differentiation in Western thought.
Copyright (c) 2025 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.29.2.131-152.2025
Defamation of Freedom, Discrimination of Dignity
In contemporary Western liberalism, freedom of expression is often elevated to a fundamental value that is supposed to protect the plurality of opinions and the autonomy of each individual. However, in the context of pornography, this ideal becomes entangled in its own contradictory web, where freedom of expression threatens to become a means of reinforcing inequality. This article problematizes the liberal understanding of such freedom, which, in the name of tolerance, often overlooks the power relations that condition this discourse. In the first part of the article, we present R. Dworkin's understanding of freedom as uncoerced choice and C. A. MacKinnon's feminist critique, which argues that pornography is not only freedom of expression but also a discourse in which freedom of expression turns into freedom of oppression. In the second part, we argue that liberal tolerance of content that degrades (especially female) bodies reveals the paradox of tolerance, which loses itself in fear of censorship. In conclusion, we emphasize that freedom without ethical responsibility does not liberate, but discriminates.
Copyright (c) 2025 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.29.1.113-128.2025
This paper reflects on the type of citizen required by a liberal-democratic society and the role of the educational system in shaping »good« citizens. Good citizenship goes beyond civic knowledge and skills. It is grounded in civic virtues (responsibility, justice, solidarity, willingness to cooperate, and concern for the common good), which include motivation and are expressed through actions. The educational system plays a crucial role in developing these qualities, but it is only one of the factors that influence young people. Equally important are the school’s connections with other social spheres and a holistic approach to civic education. An analysis of the current curriculum for the subject Civic and Homeland Culture and Ethics shows that it places greater emphasis on civic knowledge than on civic skills and virtues. The international ICCS 2022 study highlights the weak performance of Slovenian primary school students in civic knowledge, their attitudes toward key social issues, their limited participation in school and other contexts, as well as their expressed willingness to engage in the future.
Copyright (c) 2025 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.29.1.93-112.2025
In his Ethics (1677), Spinoza defends monism – the idea that there exists a single substance that is identical with God and nature. Mind and body are its expressions, which we perceive as two distinct attributes (of the same substance): thought and extension. Spinoza’s philosophy of affects (developed in Parts Three and Four of the Ethics) focuses on understanding human emotions as natural phenomena governed by the universal laws of nature. According to Spinoza, a person who does not master their affects is a slave to fate, while freedom can be achieved through the guidance of reason. He distinguishes between active and passive affects: active affects arise from reason and enhance a person’s power, whereas passive affects diminish their capacity to act. Spinoza’s philosophy offers a theoretical framework for understanding emotions that was revolutionary for his time and remains influential even in contemporary psychological and neuroscientific research.
Copyright (c) 2025 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.29.1.73-90.2025
I Understand the Story – I Understand the World?
Contemporary debates in the analytical philosophy of fiction have revolved around the epistemic value of literary works. The article attempts to bridge the gap between optimistic literary cognitivists and sceptical anti-cognitivists by arguing that the epistemic contribution of literature lies more in understanding than in the search for bare facts. The basis for this is the distinction between propositional knowledge and understanding, which literary works enable even in non-realistic genres. Understanding will be treated as an independent epistemological concept, distinct from a type of knowledge. In doing so, I draw on contemporary neocognitivist approaches (Mikkonen, Ferran), which treat understanding as a central epistemic virtue, and on the critique of the aesthetic distinction between philosophy and literature (Vidmar Jovanović). The final section of the article considers aesthetic objections to cognitivism (as developed by Lamarque and Olsen), who argue that attributing epistemic value to fiction is trivial and potentially dangerous, as it risks reducing works of art to a purely didactic instrument. I attempt to demonstrate how fiction, through its aesthetic form and complexity, facilitates cognitive gains that extend beyond its didactic role.
Copyright (c) 2025 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.29.1.23-46.2025
Analysis of Time in Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty
I will argue that Wittgenstein distinguishes three senses in which we speak of seeing the content of our perception. These senses are: seeing in the literal sense, as colors and shapes; seeing in some consciously established regard, such as recognizing a rabbit in the duck-rabbit illusion; and seeing an aspect in some spontaneous regard. I will compare this starting point with the idea of the conceptual horizon, through which Merleau-Ponty interprets time as an existential situation. I will show the surprising similarities in the thought of these two philosophers, especially when they meet in the reflections in Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, where Wittgenstein imagines a hypothetical person who is “aspect-blind,” and the interpretation of the anomalous behavior of a patient suffering from brain damage, which we find in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. I will then situate Merleau-Ponty within the discourse surrounding three models of temporal consciousness, which I roughly divide into retentional, extensional, and kinematic models. I conclude the contribution with Wittgenstein’s distinction between time as a phenomenal and a public coordinate system. Through this, we will develop some fruitful images for thinking about the concept of time.
Copyright (c) 2025 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.29.1.49-72.2025
V članku analizirava Miščevićevo (2007) zamisel, da lahko upoštevanje koherence prispeva k zmanjšanju reflektivne sreče, tj. oblike epistemske sreče, ki izvira iz agentove lastne kognitivne krhkosti. Pri tem se opirava na rezultate najinega nedavno razvitega računalniškega modela, v katerem simulirava agente, ki svoja prepričanja posodabljajo verjetnostno, hkrati pa lahko filtrirajo dokazila glede na njihov vpliv na koherenco. Rezultati kažejo, da koherenčno filtriranje v hrupnih okoljih izboljša stabilnost, saj agente ščiti pred naključnimi dezinformacijami, čeprav je končni izid odvisen od teoretske sreče oz. z Miščevićevim izrazom, »sreče iz naslanjača« (v najinem primeru to označuje agentova začetna prepričanja). V pristranskih okoljih pa ista strategija vodi do zavračanja boljših dokazil in s tem k utrjevanju napačnih prepričanj. Zagovarjava, da koherenca ni univerzalna epistemska vrlina, temveč prilagodljiva strategija, katere uspešnost je odvisna od okolja. Najine ugotovitve tako razširjajo Miščevićev predlog in poudarjajo pomen fleksibilnosti pri oblikovanju prepričanj.
Copyright (c) 2025 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.29.1.3-22.2025
The article compares Illich’s and Rawls’s understanding of the role of institutions in shaping a just social order and ensuring individual autonomy. Rawls regards social institutions as the essential foundation of a just and stable societal structure, while Illich highlights their limitations, particularly concerning legitimacy and political, ideological, and economic neutrality. According to Illich, institutions can threaten individual freedom when they shift from being the means for achieving goals to becoming ends in themselves. As an alternative, he proposes a convivial community that rejects tools – namely systems, technologies, and institutions – that could degenerate into mechanisms of control or restrictions on freedom. However, even this solution is not without risks, as it may fall into the same problems as institutions by adopting certain forms of control and restriction characteristic of traditional communities. Despite these limitations, Illich’s critique underscores the need for institutional reform to ensure that they truly serve the protection of individual freedom and autonomy.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.2.153-166.2024
What Can We Really Say About Fictional Characters?
The article discusses how the theory of pretense and the artefactual theory of fiction work in internal and external talk about fiction, and why both fictional anti-realism and realism run into difficulties. It presents Amie Thomasson's (2003b) solution, which preserves the existence of fictional characters as abstract artefacts, but still adopts pretense into the intrafictional discourse to resolve the ambiguities that arise when using fictional names in different contexts. The problematic nature of de re pretense, which requires pretending that an abstract object has concrete properties, is highlighted. If we reject de re pretense and accept de dicto pretense in the fictional discourse, we lose the uniformity of the theory and claim that fictional names refer in one part of the discourse but not in the other. The aim of this paper is to suggest that, although it requires a dual use of fictive names, the introduction of pretense into a realist theory of fiction does a better job of explaining our understanding of talk about fiction than anti-realist theories.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.2.169-186.2024
Modal Catapults and the Limits of Modal Logic
I explore modal “catapults,” a variety of closure principles for modal operators. Consider a proposition p that logically implies, entails, strictly implies, modally implies, materially implies, …, a proposition q. According to the appropriate catapult for a modal operator M, if Mp, then also Mq. Modal catapults play a crucial role in the logical analysis of traditional philosophical arguments, such as fatalism and incompatibilism. Additionally, standard deontic paradoxes and moral dilemmas involve a deontic modal catapult in some form. In the realm of deontic logic, I advocate for a solution grounded in actualism and counterfactuals (Jackson, Goble). In considering whether it ought to be that A we should look particularly at what would be the case, were A the case. This approach explains the failures of closure while still acknowledging its central role in modal reasoning. Modal catapults are indispensable to the logic of modalities, but they also delineate the boundaries of this approach.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.2.189-208.2024
The paper, motivated by the chapter in Šuster’s book, considers the aspect of the so-called Fitch’s ar-gument (FA) that seriously challenges the verificationist theory. Contrary to Šuster’s view, it is throughout the paper that I’m pursuing the idea that most of the attempts that intend to vindicate verifi-cationism from the grip of Fitch’s argument, including Edgington’s theory, fail in their intention. Con-cerning the attempts to mitigate the effect of Fitch’s argument to verificationism in the framework of classical logic (Eddington as the most important representative), I’m siding with their critics (William-son, Percival) and claim that they fail in their intention. Regarding the attempts to block the effect of Fitch’s argument in the framework of non-classical (intuitionistic, relevant, dialetheist, and so on) log-ic, they do it by introducing principles that invalidate some of the basic classical rules and principles, usually introducing trivial worlds. In that case, the verificationist principle (as well as all inferences included in Fitch’s argument) is vacuously valid, which seems to be unsatisfactory. In any case, there is no decisive evidence that either classical or any of the non-classical approaches can avail the verifi-cationist anything to escape out of the grip of FA.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.2.209-228.2024
I am discussing the concept of possible worlds as it is used in modal semantics, which Danilo Šuster also discusses in his book Modal Catapults. I wonder how to understand possible worlds in the talk of the non-existent, for example, in explicitly imaginary discourses. Only the context of the discussion, where modal propositions about virtual (irreal) entities or virtual (irreal) states of affairs appear but not a priori judgments about what is in principle logically possible or impossible, can establish a meaningful speech about relevant possible worlds. This raises several problems, e.g., interpreting statements that refer to both real and virtual entities, especially interpreting some counterfactuals about real and virtual entities. It seems that in some instances, we cannot “get rid” of counterfactuality, e.g., by semantic conversion into ordinary general sentences about possible worlds of a certain kind.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.2.229-238.2024
Despite our best efforts, we often fail to act in a perfectly rational manner. Recently, some epistemologists have suggested that we should admit our failings and develop a modest epistemology that would take our fallibility seriously. This includes accounting for the role of evidence of our irrationality, usually called higher-order evidence. It seems intuitive that modest reasoners should take such evidence into account. However, it turns out that incorporating higher-order evidence into a principled theory of what rationality requires is not an easy task. In this paper, I first review the debate about higher-order evidence, describing in detail the puzzle of higher-order evidence and the main positions about it in the literature. Then, I provide two novel examples of higher-order evidence, taken from science. I argue that these examples put pressure on the views that reject the role of higher-order evidence. These views commit themselves to the conclusion that some common scientific practices, such as evaluating evidence in systematic reviews or even running null hypothesis significance tests, are irrational.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.2.241-262.2024
Recently, informal epistemology has centred on a theory of epistemic virtues and vices, rooted in Aristotle's virtue ethics and divided into two key approaches: reliabilism and responsibilism, which offer related but contrasting views. Quassim Cassam's work has advanced the perception of vices as behaviours that prevent access to knowledge, classified by fidelity. The theory of epistemic virtues and vices has also led to the theory of argumentative virtues, notably developed by Andrew Aberdein, who examines the transmission of knowledge and belief through argumentation. Argumentative vices, by the same theory, are characteristics that lead to fallacious argumentation and acceptance of flawed arguments. However, Cohen argues that not all knowledge transfer – such as inferential statements or classroom conversation – is necessarily argumentative. Since belief transfer can occur non-argumentatively, it is reasonable to seek an argumentation-related vice in such cases. Grice's theory of implicatures suggests flawed statements generate pragmatic implications, creating space to examine epistemic vices in language within non-argumentative belief transfer contexts.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.2.285-310.2024
The Goals of Bounded Epistemic Rationality
Notions of rationality in epistemology are often based on idealised models of epistemic agents and the environment in which they are embedded. The concept of bounded epistemic rationality aims to avoid such idealizations and proposes norms of inquiry based on empirical data about the limitations of human cognition and the features of the epistemic environment. Drawing on Simon's work on bounded rationality, Gigerenzer's notion of ecological rationality, and McKenna's programme of non-ideal epistemology, it functions as a hybrid concept that contains both normative and descriptive elements and offers epistemic advice that helps to improve our epistemic position and achieve our epistemic goals. Traditionally, epistemic goals include forming true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs, justification, knowledge, and understanding. In this paper, I summarise selected aspects of the debate about epistemic values and goals, focusing on veritistic monism, and reflect on the goals of bounded epistemic rationality. I conclude that bounded epistemic strives towards various forms of cognitive success, not only towards the truth, but limits rational inquiry to questions relevant to the epistemic agent.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.2.263-284.2024
Between Sense and Meaning: In Relation to Frege, Can We Form an Alternative Way of Distinguishing Between Sense and Meaning?
How can one determine a difference between Sense and Meaning? Is there an alternative to the way of differentiation between Sense and Meaning as being used by one of the fathers of modern analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), whereby we think his well-known finding that »whereas the sense of the Morning and the Evening Star is different, their meaning is the same«? The organon that we developed comprises some descriptions of the thinking, bodily, and intuitive cogito. The differentiation among the inherent systems of organization and functioning of the three kinds of cogito shows that an alternative description of differentiation between the typical products of the thinking (sense) and the intuitive cogito (meaning) can be ascertained. This is a differentiation between Sense and Meaning that is different from the one in Frege.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.1.123-150.2024
Is Quine’s Problem of Indeterminacy Of Translation and Reference Relevant for Linguistic And Translation Theories?
The paper examines the concept of equivalence in translation theory, exploring its various interpretations and criticisms. It analyses different approaches to equivalence in the literature, including Catford's notion of equivalence, Nida and Taber's formal and dynamic equivalence, and Koller's five types of equivalence. The paper then considers critiques of equivalence, focusing on the critiques based on the influence of Quine's indeterminacy of translation and reference. It argues that while Quine's problem challenges the notion of meaningbased equivalence, other forms of equivalence remain viable, although accepting Quine's position necessitates the elimination of meaning itself. Finally, the paper weighs the implications of these different perspectives on translation theory. While accepting Quine's view challenges some forms of equivalence, it does not completely invalidate the concept. Other types of equivalence, such as those focused on function or effect, remain valid. However, accepting Quine's view requires eliminating the concept of meaning, which has profound implications for the field of translation studies and linguistics in general.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.1.103-122.2024
The Ontology of Dance Through the Lens of Plato’s Theory of Forms and Plato’s Evaluation of Dance
In this article we discuss the ontology of dance from the perspectives of Plato and contemporary authors. We begin by presenting various philosophical aspects of the concept of dance. This is followed by an analysis of the ontology of dance, where we draw on the thinking of the contemporary authors Osintseva and Pakes. The latter focuses (among other things) on the parallels between Platonism and the ontology of dance. In the following, we examine relevant Platonic ontology or Theory of Forms, which posits the existence of a suprasensible realm. The article addresses the issue of Plato's critique of art in The Republic, where he advocates for the exclusion of artists from the ideal state. Plato perceived art as imitation, which he argued had a negative influence on the population. These views seem inconsistent with his positive attitude towards art in elementary education. In ancient Greece, a person skilled in dance was considered educated. Plato incorporated the concept of harmony into his philosophy of music, a quality still regarded as one of the highest virtues in music and dance today. In conclusion, we compare ballet with Plato's Theory of Forms, revealing their similarities.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.1.77-100.2024
The Transcendent in the Cinematic Experience
Based on the theory of conceptual metaphors, we will introduce the idea of God and the divine as a concept, referring to how cinematic art depicts and treats spiritual or religious themes. In addition to mentioning traditional metaphors, we will focus on the idea of transcendence as an experience of transcending everyday perception and understanding of the world. We will explore the phenomenological relationship between immanence and transcendence, particularly in relation to how films attempt to depict the experience of ecstasy and otherness and to create experiences that transcend rational understanding. Since cinematic art does not depend solely on verbal expression but, to a large extent, on the sensual and emotional response of the viewer, it is of particular interest here because it manages to break through the boundaries of rational discourse and provide access to experiences usually associated with religion and spirituality. We will describe some possible strategies through which films evoke the meaning and sense of the transcendent in the living body of the viewer and examine how film becomes a means of expressing the ineffable – the (divine) reality that is beyond language.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.1.51-76.2024
The article pursues two goals: to provide a working definition of terrorism and to critically evaluate the argumentative strategies leading to its near-universal moral condemnation. The author advocates for a definition of terrorism tailored to the needs of moral evaluation: the indiscriminate use of violence—or the serious threat thereof— with the aim or purpose of coercing (authorities) into implementing more or less radical political or social changes. Regarding the second, the author acknowledges that terrorists, through deliberate, but indiscriminate physical and psychological violence, assume a heavy moral burden. However, the argument is made that terrorism is not significantly different in this respect from other forms of politically motivated violence that are generally tolerated or even celebrated and admired, such as armed uprisings, and wars. Whether terrorism ultimately collapses under this moral burden will depend on the concrete justification, interpretation, and application of the principle of civilian immunity—a task far more challenging upon reflection than its commonly assumed. Finally, there are no compelling reasons to equate terrorism with extremism, especially when one considers how much more lenient we are toward other forms of politically motivated violence, which are, at best, morally equivalent to terrorism and, at worst, inferior.
Copyright (c) 2024 University of Maribor, University Press https://doi.org/10.18690/analiza.28.1.3-50.2024
Status umetne inteligence v svetu umetnosti
The Status of Artificial Intelligence in the World of Art Today, we are witnessing a very rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) in practically all fields. The most widely known or notable development in the field of AI is the development of ChatGPT by OpenAI. ChatGPT is a tool which answers questions, and helps in writing texts, essays, and programming code with the help of AI. However, in recent years, another form of creative AI has been brought closer to the public, which, however, does not deal with language, but is artistically involved in the field of visual and other arts. Probably the most famous AI software for creating or generating visual art is DALL-E, which, like ChatGPT, is owned by OpenAI. In the article, we will touch upon the “problem” of introducing AI into the art world and what AI art represents to society in contrast to “normal” human art. We will mainly be interested in questions such as what AI art is, whether AI art can even be considered art, whether AI can be an artist in itself or is just a tool, and how and why AI art affects art itself.
Copyright (c) 2023 University of Maribor, University Press https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Problem ne-identitete kot problem okoljske etike?
The Non-identity Problem as a Problem of Environmental Ethics? In environmental ethics, the non-identity problem (NIP) is often considered to be a theoretical obstacle to climate change mitigation. It is based on the conflict between the intuition that some of our actions that affect future generations have moral value and the conclusion that because of their nature of influencing identity, it is difficult to point to the people who are harmed by them. In this article, I try to show that NIP does not pose such problems. First, I present the NIP in detail. Then, I analyse two approaches that question the premise that actions such as adopting one energy policy instead of another affect the identity of future generations. The first approach calls into question the notion of identity that this premise presupposes, while the second questions the notion of influencing identity. I also highlight some possible criticisms of both approaches and respond to them. In conclusion, I consider the practical implications of NIP for environmental measures and conclude that decisions concerning future generations are, from a practical point of view, analogous to decisions concerning contemporaries.
Chromatic Illumination Some cases of chromatic illumination are presented. The question about the importance of chromatic illumination for epistemology is then approached. There is a tension between the epistemic experiential evidence and the richness of morphological content, a tension dissolved through chromatic illumination. Understanding of chromatic illumination efficacy is facilitated through “iceberg epistemology.” Above the waterline there is occurrent conscious cognitive intentional content. Under the water surface, there is a plurality of nonconscious intentional contents, which are not represented in the overwater scene. They are rather appreciated there, through the mediation of their features, illuminating the mentioned scene and providing attitudinal direction of the overwater surface intentional content. The deepest area of iceberg epistemology is due to its unconscious part, providing causal efficacy to the overwater scene, being experienced in an outof-the-blue manner. We propose that the area of epistemic justification in belief formation follows normative diversity in the ethical appropriateness judgment: The difference between the good and the right may be compared to objective epistemic propositional justification and doxastic belief justification with the epistemic agent’s engagement.
Pripovedna umetnost in terapevtsko samospoznanje
Narrative Art and Therapeutic Self-knowledge In recent years, there have been debates in aesthetics and philosophy of art on the question of whether we can acquire knowledge about the world from works of art. However, little has been written about the effects of art on cultivating self-knowledge and self-development. While, for most of us, it seems obvious that art has these effects, little is known about how and why these effects occur. Addressing this issue is the main aim of this paper. The gist of the argument is that narrative art provides a unique opportunity to adopt a dual (first- and third-personal) perspective on the self, which has been argued recently by psychologists and philosophers of mind to be necessary for obtaining the kind of self-knowledge that leads to self-development and self-change, i.e., therapeutic self-knowledge.
The article deals with Wittgenstein’s understanding of ethics and aesthetics. The author presents the understanding of early Wittgenstein. He first explains Wittgenstein’s understanding of ethics, and afterwards, his view on the ethical importance of the aesthetic attitude. In this context, he explains in what sense we can talk about ethics as an ineffable (transcendental) condition. The following claim is explained: ethical tautologies are sacrosanct or even sacred, and their violation is tragic; changing the attitude towards the world changes the limits of the world, but not the facts of the world, and the world becomes a different world; ethical »sentences« are formal and absolute; ethics and aesthetics are one; an aesthetic attitude is the heart of a happy life; the ethics of early Wittgenstein is "egocentric" or solipsistic, eudaimonistic, has the characteristics of ethics as an art of life, and is of a personal nature, the ethics of the individual.
Kant and Schiller: Moral Law, Inclinations, and Virtue - Part I. Schiller – in contrast to Kant – relocated or situated beauty in the realm of practical reason in Kallias. This means that the principle of beauty is not constitutive but rather regulative, which, in other words, implies that everyone should perceive beauty in the object. According to Schiller, beauty is nothing but freedom in appearance. The question is which appearances deserve to be interpreted in this way? Schiller is convinced that we attribute freedom to those objects that are self-determining, those that act solely from themselves. His »objective« principle should be interpreted only in terms of »subjective universality«. In this sense, Schiller does not advance beyond Kant, who also supports »subjective universality«. The article compares the viewpoint of Schiller on one side and Kant on the other and concludes that, based on the analyzed topic, here Schiller was a step ahead of Kant, and it took Kant a few years to arrive at an almost identical position.
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